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Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal
Regulatory Responses to American Indian
Religious Claims on Public Land
Marcia Yablon

INTRODUCTION
According to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Kw’st’an
Sacred Sites at Indian Pass in Imperial County, California, are one of
America’s eleven most endangered historic places.1 For thousands of years,
American Indians from the Quechan tribe have undertaken spiritual
pilgrimages to these sites and conducted religious ceremonies known as
Keruk, in which they have cremated their dead and assisted in bringing
them to the next world.2 These sites are on the National Trust’s list because,
in addition to being rich in spiritual and cultural significance, Indian Pass is
also rich in gold. Glamis Gold Ltd., a Canadian mining company, is seeking
permission to extract the gold; if granted, such permission will result in “a
massive 1,600-acre cyanide heap-leach gold-mine that will leave a gaping
hole in the ground and a skyscraper-size mound of toxic waste.”3
The situation at Indian Pass is not unique. Dozens and potentially
hundreds of Indian sacred sites face similar threats.4 For those seeking to

1. The National Trust issues an annual list of the eleven most endangered historic places
in the United States. The 2002 list included the Kw’st’an Sacred Sites as well as a collection
of Indian sacred sites along the Missouri River. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., America’s 11 Most
Endangered Historic Places 2002, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2002/sacredsites.html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Endangered Historic
Places 2002]. In addition, the 2003 list included the Zuni Salt Lake, discussed in Part III. Nat’l
Trust for Historic Pres., America’s 11 Most Endangered Historic Places 2003, at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2003/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
2. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Endangered Historic Places 2002, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. The number of threatened sites has varied over the years. In 1993, the Association on
American Indian Affairs identified forty-four sites as threatened by tourism, development, and
vandalism. Karen L. Michel, Indians To Ask U.S. To Bolster Law on Religious Freedom, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1A. In November 2002, the National Congress of American
Indians identified twenty-three sites as facing such threats. Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians,
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protect such sites, both the problems and the solution are clear. Most sacred
sites supporters believe that the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to find that
the First Amendment mandates the protection of sacred sites has led to this
precarious and distressing situation.5 They further believe that the only way
to ensure the protection of these sites is either to overrule the Court’s
previous decisions6 or to pass a comprehensive statute giving tribes the
power to prevent the destruction or development of their sacred sites.7
Those holding this view believe that anything less than these types of
sweeping measures will be disastrous for the future of Indian sacred sites.
Yet as widespread as this belief is, it may not be correct. Furthermore, it
may actually be a good thing for society as a whole that these proposed
protections have not succeeded.
Indian sacred sites are lands that hold significant spiritual value for an
Indian tribe. These sites may be discrete geological monuments such as
Bear Lodge (also known as Devils Tower) in Wyoming, a sixty-millionyear-old rock formation made from the hardened magma of an extinct
volcano,8 or wide swaths of land such as the Indian Pass Sacred Sites, a
series of trails running from Los Angeles to Mexico.9 Some sites factor into
a tribe’s creation myth or are vital to the continuing practice of a tribe’s

Resolution #SD-02-018, Protection of Threatened Sacred Places: An Urgent Priority,
http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/2002Annual/018.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
5. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brooks, Note, Native American Indians’ Fruitless Search for First
Amendment Protection of Their Sacred Religious Sites, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 546 (1990)
(stating that “the Court severely narrowed the protection that the first amendment has traditionally
given religious practices and incorrectly concluded that there was no burden on any Native
American Indian religious practice”).
6. Joel Brady, “Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being”: Native American Sacred Site
Protection on Federal Public Land Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
153, 172-73 (1999-2000) (“[T]he hope is that Bear Lodge will actually make its way to the
Supreme Court and set new precedent [regarding the constitutionality of protecting sacred
sites].”).
7. For an example of such legislation, see the narrowly defeated California bills S. 1828,
2001-2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), WL 2001 CA S.B. 1828 (SN), and S. 483,
2001-2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), WL 2001 CA S.B. 483 (SN), which would have
given “Native American tribes in California de facto veto power to strike down public and private
development projects throughout the state,” Bill Horn, Clash of Cultures, Religions, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at B13. Fifty California tribes supported the bills. James May,
Davis Vetoes Sacred Sites Bill, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at A1; see also Brady,
supra note 6, at 175-78 (discussing the Native American Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of
Religion Act of 1994, S. 2269, 103d Cong. (1994), which would have increased protection for
Indian sacred sites but failed in the Senate, in large part due to Establishment Clause concerns
over its constitutionality); Shawna Lee, Note, Government Managed Shrines: Protection of Native
American Sacred Site Worship, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 304-08 (2000) (discussing the
difficulties of drafting constitutional sacred sites protection legislation).
8. Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge and the Uphill Battle Facing Native
American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW & INEQ. 157, 174 (2002).
9. A Bill To Protect Sacred Native American Federal Lands: Hearing on H.R. 5155 Before
the House Comm. on Res., 107th Cong. 58 (2002) (statement of R. Timothy McCrum, Partner,
Crowell & Moring LLP, on behalf of Glamis Imperial Corp.) [hereinafter Sacred Land Hearings].
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religion.10 For example, for the past 10,000 years, the Lakota have
performed their most important religious ceremonies, such as yearly Sun
Dances, at Bear Lodge.11 Conversely, other sites are used less regularly and
for multiple purposes. The Quechan tribe has used Indian Pass for a variety
of religious purposes, including Keruk, the ceremony of bringing the dead
into the next world; vision quests, where tribal members run in search of
visions; and prayer circles.12
Just as there are different types of sacred sites, these sites face many
different types of threats. For instance, Bear Lodge is a national monument
and, as such, is in no danger of being demolished or developed. But for
those tribes that believe Bear Lodge is a sacred site, simply having the site
open to the public—especially for activities such as rock climbing—is seen
as a serious threat. The threat to Indian Pass is even starker: Parts of it face
destruction if developers are given the right to dig up the land and turn it
into a leach mine. Although the threats to these sites are serious, the costs of
protecting them are just as significant. The difficulty with sacred sites
protection is that preventing development and other uses of these lands
often has a huge economic impact. For instance, the Glamis gold mine
alone may be worth as much as fifty million dollars.13
All sacred sites controversies involve the issue of control: Who has the
right to control how these sites are used and who gets to use them? The
difficulty of the issue is compounded by its magnitude. There are literally
tens of thousands of sacred sites. For example, in South Dakota’s Black
Hills alone, “[t]here are hundreds and estimated thousands of sacred
sites.”14 Similarly, the shores of the Missouri River “have hundreds of
Indian graves and sacred sites.”15 Furthermore, many of these sites
encompass vast expanses of land. Indian Pass is estimated to cover
“hundreds of square miles in southern California.”16 An area extending as
much as fifteen miles inland along the entire 1100-mile length of the
California coast is also considered a sacred site.17 In fact, an expansive
10. Bonham, supra note 8, at 175.
11. Id. at 175-76 & n.137.
12. Daniel Kraker, Defending the Sacred: Tribes Closer to Meaningful Protection of
Religious Sites, AM. INDIAN REP., Nov. 2002, at 12, 14.
13. Courtney Ann Coyle, Defending Quechan Indian Pass—Again, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Nov. 12, 2003, at A4. In addition, the development of these lands also frequently brings
much-needed employment opportunities. See infra text accompanying note 206 (discussing the
Zuni Salt Lake).
14. David Melmer, Black Hills Defenders Raise Management Issues, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2003, at B2.
15. Bill Lambrecht, Boaters Will Face River with Perils Aplenty, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 15, 2002, at A1.
16. Sacred Land Hearings, supra note 9, at 58 (statement of R. Timothy McCrum, Partner,
Crowell & Moring LLP, on behalf of Glamis Imperial Corp.).
17. James May, Lawmakers Aim To Protect Sacred Sites Along California Coast, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, July 16, 2003, at A1.
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definition of sacred sites could encompass a sizeable portion of the
undeveloped land in the United States. Accordingly, who decides which
sites get protected has enormous ramifications.
Currently, federal land management agencies are responsible for the
majority of decisions regarding Indian sacred sites located on federal land.
Given that, in the past, land management agencies were often responsible
for the decisions to destroy sacred sites, it is little wonder that most tribes
and sacred sites supporters are dubious that these agencies will provide any
real protection.18 But such mistrust may no longer be justified. Land
management agencies are increasingly working to protect sacred sites, and
in many instances such agencies are able to provide a form of protection
that most of society would find preferable to the protections available
through the courts or Congress. Unfortunately, many scholars are still so
caught up in the perceived lack of broad sacred sites protection that they
seem unable to acknowledge that many of these sites are being preserved
without any sweeping protections. This Note argues that agency
management of Indian sacred sites, in conjunction with statutory
consultation provisions and backed by judicial enforcement, is the best
form of protection for these sites. In addition, it shows that because of the
effectiveness of agency protections, the persistent scholarly arguments for
broader judicial or legislative protections are no longer appropriate. This
Note also examines the problems with relying on exclusively judicial or
legislative protection. It concludes that, because of their greater flexibility,
agencies are able to offer a method of sacred sites protection that is better
for society as a whole, even if it is less desirable from the viewpoint of
individual tribes.
Part I examines the history of Indian sacred sites protection. It discusses
the historic lack of agency protection for these sites, the attempt and failure
to win judicial protection for them in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n,19 and the impact of Lyng on later sacred sites protection
efforts. Part II focuses on recent federal agency efforts to preserve sacred
sites, the effectiveness of these efforts, and the reasons behind this change
in agency policy. Part III argues that agencies are better able to consider the
interests of all users of sacred sites, and therefore that agency protection,
when combined with statutory consultation provisions and judicial
enforcement, is preferable to the exclusively judicial and legislative
protections typically sought by sacred sites advocates. Part III also
addresses common criticisms of agency accommodation and explains why

18. See, e.g., George Linge, Ensuring the Full Freedom of Religion on Public Lands: Devils
Tower and the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 314 (2000).
19. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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agency protection does not leave tribes at the mercy of agency goodwill and
changing politics.
I. THE HISTORY OF INDIAN SACRED SITES PROTECTION
The distrust many sacred sites advocates feel toward land management
agencies is warranted. Historically, these agencies have frequently allowed,
and even actively encouraged, the development of Indian sacred sites. In
1979, for instance, the U.S. Forest Service approved the development and
expansion of the government-owned Snow Bowl ski area on the San
Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest of Arizona, despite
knowing that the Peaks were sacred to both the Navajo and Hopi tribes.20
Similarly, in 1963, the National Park Service built the Glen Canyon Dam in
northern Arizona, creating Lake Powell and submerging a sacred Navajo
prayer spot. In addition to cutting off access to these now-submerged lands,
the formation of the lake dramatically increased the number of visitors to
Rainbow Bridge, a geological wonder and an important Indian sacred site.21
Before the creation of the lake, few tourists visited the bridge, but after the
lake was created, the bridge became a popular tourist destination, adding to
the desecration of the site. The increased tourism was actively encouraged
by the Park Service, which licensed the operation of tour boats and other
tourist activities around the bridge.22 In yet another instance of agency
involvement in sacred site destruction, the Tennessee Valley Authority—a
federal agency created by Congress to provide flood control, navigation,
and electric power in the Tennessee Valley region—decided to flood lands
along the Little Tennessee River, including burial grounds that were sacred
to the Cherokee and integral to their religious practices.23
These are just some examples that demonstrate the indifference
agencies have often shown in the past toward the protection of sacred sites
and Indian culture.24 It is this history of indifference that has convinced
many scholars and tribal advocates that agencies will never protect Indian
sacred sites and that the only way to preserve these lands is through judicial
or legislative measures.25
20. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21. For factual background, see Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Utah 1977),
aff’d, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
22. See id.
23. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
24. For other examples of agencies violating Indian religious practices and destroying sacred
sites, see Michael J. Simpson, Accommodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993 Amendment
to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 54 MONT. L. REV. 19, 33 nn.76-77, 34 n.82, 35
nn.87-88 (1993).
25. See Linge, supra note 18, at 307, 314 (bemoaning the fact that the federal government
“routinely has acted or has permitted private actions that rendered Indian sacred sites inaccessible
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A. Sacred Sites Litigation Prior to Lyng
Throughout the 1980s, Indian tribes brought numerous First
Amendment suits challenging the constitutionality of developing Indian
sacred sites located on federal land. These tribes based their challenges on
free exercise grounds, claiming that development on lands they considered
sacred would unconstitutionally prevent them from observing religious
rituals connected to these sites.26 However, even before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
the case most scholars agree ended the possibility of using the First
Amendment to protect sacred sites,27 free exercise challenges met with little
success. Circuit courts hearing these First Amendment cases made it
abundantly clear that suits attacking land agency plans for the development
of sacred sites would not be viewed favorably. Over and over again, tribes
lost these challenges.28
In Wilson v. Block, the Hopi and Navajo tribes challenged the
aforementioned expansion of the Snow Bowl ski resort on their sacred
lands.29 The D.C. Circuit rejected their challenge and held that the agency’s
decision to permit development did not violate the First Amendment
because the agency did not deny the tribes access to their sacred sites.30
Similarly, in Badoni v. Higginson, in which the Navajo Indians challenged
the National Park Service’s decision to create Lake Powell and permit
tourists to visit Rainbow Bridge, the Tenth Circuit held that the agency’s
decision did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.31 Like the D.C. Circuit,
the Badoni court based its opinion in large part on the fact that the Indians
in the area still had access to the bridge.32 In both cases, continued access
was a key factor in the courts’ decisions to uphold the development on
sacred sites.
However, in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the case
challenging the flooding of burial sites in the Tennessee Valley, even the
preservation of tribal access to integral sacred sites was not considered
and unusable for religious ceremonies,” and arguing that although “courts scarcely have
considered the Indian claims in any but the strictest, most limiting terms,” there is “an alternative
theory of ‘full’ religious freedom which would support [sacred sites protection]”); Lee, supra note
7, at 265 (“Currently, there is no general sacred site protection law. The need for such protection
is apparent . . . . In addition, there is no binding judicial precedent that would offer sacred site
protection.”).
26. In these cases, tribes typically sought injunctive relief. See, e.g., Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp.
at 610; Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 643.
27. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
28. David S. Johnston, Note, The Native American Plight: Protection and Preservation of
Sacred Sites, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 443, 448 (2002).
29. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 740.
31. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
32. See id. at 178.
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necessary.33 In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit held that the agency’s decision
to flood the valley did not infringe the Cherokee Indians’ free exercise
rights, despite the fact that the released waters completely submerged
numerous sacred sites. According to the court, the flooding was
constitutional because the tribe had failed to offer enough evidence of the
centrality or indispensability of that particular valley to Cherokee religious
observance.34
In these cases, the courts paid little more than lip service to the land
management agencies’ obligations to consider tribal interests in the lands
they had managed. For example, in Wilson, the court concluded that the
Forest Service had an obligation only “to avoid unnecessary interference
with[] traditional Indian religious practices.”35 The Wilson court did not
make any effort to encourage agency accommodation of Indian interests.
Although it held that agencies were obligated to consider tribal interests, the
opinion described this obligation as one with “no teeth,” implying it would
have little effect on how agency decisions were evaluated.36
This dismissive attitude toward accommodation changed in Lyng.
Although a tribe lost once again, the Court adopted a different conception
of land management agencies’ obligation to consider and accommodate
tribal interests. In foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng Court shut off
one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested another, more feasible
method in its place—agency accommodation.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Lyng
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n effectively ended
the possibility of using the First Amendment to force federal agencies to
protect Indian sacred sites.37 In Lyng, the U.S. Forest Service attempted to
complete a logging road through the Six Rivers National Forest in
northwestern California, despite the religious use of the area by three Indian
tribes.38 These tribes challenged the construction of the road, arguing that it
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court held that there was no constitutional violation because the
road would not coerce the tribes into violating their religious beliefs:39
According to the Court, the case was primarily a dispute over property

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1164.
Wilson, 708 F.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
Id. at 747.
See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988).
Id. at 450.

YABLONFINAL.DOC

1630

4/23/2004 1:06 AM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 113: 1623

rather than one of religious freedom.40 As in previous cases, the Court made
clear that the power to decide the future of these sites should remain with
the government almost exclusively—that the government, in its capacity as
a property owner, should have wide latitude to manage its own property as
it likes. According to the Court, any other decision would result in a
“diminution of the Government’s property rights, and the concomitant
subsidy of the Indian religion.”41
Yet at the same time that the Lyng Court upheld “[t]he government’s
rights to the use of its own land,” it also explained that this right “need not
and should not discourage [federal agencies] . . . from accommodating
religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian respondents.”42
Indeed, the Court’s opinion evinced a strong support for agency
accommodation of Indian sacred sites generally. More specifically, it
encouraged accommodations that would “minimize the impact”43 of the
disputed development, and praised the Forest Service for the efforts the
agency had already made to reduce this impact—such as picking the route
“farthest removed from contemporary spiritual sites”44 and conducting a
“comprehensive study of the effects that the project would have on the
cultural and religious value” of the area.45
C. Why Lyng Was Right: The Problems with Broad Judicial Protection for
Sacred Sites
Although the Lyng Court was sympathetic to Indian concerns regarding
their sacred sites, the Court believed that land-use decisions should remain
with land management agencies and that giving control over sacred sites to
Indian tribes would be an extremely risky proposition. The Court’s concern
was apparent from its statement that “[h]owever much we might wish that it
were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to
satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”46 In particular, the Court
was worried about the future of sacred site lands and the consequences that
would follow if it required the government to manage these lands in
40. Justice Brennan’s dissent summarized the majority’s position, stating that “the Court
believes that Native Americans who request that the Government refrain from destroying their
religion effectively seek to exact from the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal
property.” Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 453 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 454.
43. Id.
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. The Court described this policy as part of the Forest Service’s duty “‘to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the
traditional religions of the American Indian.’” Id. at 454-55 (quoting the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)).
46. Id. at 452.
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accordance with tribal “religious needs and desires.”47 Such a decision
would have effectively granted tribes the exclusive right to control the use
of these lands, and the Court was understandably wary of giving them this
right. As the Lyng Court concluded, “Whatever rights the Indians may have
to the use of the area, . . . those rights do not divest the Government of its
right to use what is, after all, its land.”48 Although the tribes in Lyng were
worried about the overuse of sacred sites land, the Court was just as worried
about the potential for underuse.
The Lyng Court correctly recognized that the problem with judicial
sacred sites protection is that it is overbroad and would enable tribes to
prevent the development of vast swaths of government land. The “tragedy
of the commons” explains why a resource will be prone to overuse when
multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given
resource and no one has the right to exclude another. Conversely, as
Michael Heller demonstrated in The Tragedy of the Anticommons, “[w]hen
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone
to underuse.”49 The tribes in Lyng had use privileges, but no right to
exclude others from accessing their sacred sites. By seeking a judicial
ruling guaranteeing them a right to veto all proposed uses of sacred site
land, they were attempting to solidify this right to exclude. If the Court had
granted the tribes this veto right, judicial precedent would have resulted in
the granting of similar veto power to hundreds of other tribes, virtually
guaranteeing that all Indian sacred sites and surrounding lands would
remain unused by anyone but the tribes.50 In addition, the veto right sought
would not only have been held by the tribe as a group, but would have been
available to individual members as well, because the right to free exercise is
a personal right. As a result, even if a developer were to secure a tribe’s
permission to build on a sacred site, dissenting tribal members would still
have been able to claim that their individual free exercise rights were being
violated.
Although the tribes in Lyng hoped to block all future development,
“perpetual non-use of property” is rarely optimal.51 According to Heller,
“[A]n anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than the epitome of,
optimal use.”52 The solution to the tragedy of the anticommons is to
eliminate overlapping property rights that create the power to veto potential
47. Id.
48. Id. at 453.
49. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 624 (1998).
50. Heller disputed the previous definition of an anticommons, which required that everyone
have the right to exclude. Instead, Heller posited that “non-use can occur even when a few actors
have rights of exclusion in a resource that each wants to use.” Id. at 669.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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uses of the land.53 The Lyng Court’s decision to leave control of these lands
solely in the hands of the government ensured that federal lands would not
be subject to the tragedy of the anticommons. By ruling against the tribes,
the Court avoided a situation in which tribes could guarantee the nonuse of
significant portions of government land. The Lyng Court realized that the
veto power requested by the tribes “could easily require de facto beneficial
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property,”54 and it
accordingly acted to prevent such an occurrence.
The Lyng Court made the right decision because it chose the method of
protection that is optimal for society as a whole, even if it is less desirable
from the view of individual tribes. Although the opposite ruling might have
increased sacred sites protection, it would have come at too great a cost.
The existence of other effective methods of protecting sacred sites, as I
discuss in Part II, shows that the Court’s desire to avoid creating a vast
religious servitude on huge expanses of public land was justified. By
encouraging agency protection, the Court attempted to increase sacred sites
protection, but not to such an extent that it would have generated vast social
inefficiencies over broad swaths of government-owned land.
D. The Criticisms of Lyng
Scholars harshly criticized the Lyng decision for its perceived
insensitivity to Indian religious beliefs and practices.55 These critics
predicted that the Lyng decision would effectively eliminate the possibility
of using the First Amendment to challenge agency decisions regarding the
management of sacred sites, and post-Lyng decisions56 showed that their

53. Id. at 677-78.
54. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
55. See, e.g., Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Rehnquist Court’s Free Exercise Collision on the
Peyote Road, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 315, 329-30 (1993) (viewing Lyng as marking a “low point” in
the Court’s modern history of free exercise jurisprudence); id. at 332 (quoting Leonard Haskie,
Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council of Window Rock, Arizona, as characterizing Lyng
to be “a further blow to the religious freedom of Native American people”); Ellen Adair Page,
Note, The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 68 N.C. L. REV. 410, 421 (1990) (concluding that Lyng’s restrictive test “reeks of
injustice”); J. Brett Pritchard, Note, Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause:
Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 268, 292 (1990) (commenting that the Lyng decision “exhibited ‘distressing
insensitivity’” to religious liberties (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 41[4] (1963)
(Stewart, J., concurring))); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association: Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 483, 511 (1989) (arguing that the Lyng Court ignored past decisions supporting expansive
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
Forest Service did not violate the First Amendment when it denied a group of Sioux Indians a
special use permit that would have allowed them to occupy national forest land that they believed
was sacred).
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predictions were correct.57 Most tribes and scholars viewed this
development as a serious blow to the protection of Indian sacred sites and
were unimpressed with the Court’s encouragement of agency
accommodation.58 Many of the same critics strongly agreed with the portion
of the Lyng dissent arguing that the majority opinion “effectively bestowed
on one party to this conflict [the federal government] the unilateral
authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor, subject only to the
Court’s toothless exhortation to be ‘sensitive’ to affected religions.”59
Other critics focused on the fact that the Lyng Court’s concerns and
decision were based on Anglo-American conceptions of property, which
rest “on the notion ‘that property rights identify a private owner who has
title to a set of valued resources with a presumption of full power over those
resources.’”60 This understanding of property is very different from Indian
conceptions of property, which view the “land as utterly incapable of
reduction to ownership as property by human beings.”61 These
commentators objected to the use of Western property values, so different
from Indian understandings of property, to determine the future of Indian
sacred sites.62 Howard Vogel strongly criticized this practice, stating that
57. As Charlton Bonham wrote,
The decision in Lyng effectively marked the end of Native American attempts to
employ the Free Exercise Clause to protect Native American religious sites on public
lands because it established the demanding “coerced or penalized” standard. Thus,
despite the language of the Free Exercise Clause prohibiting governmental interference
with religious practices, tribes have been unsuccessful in challenging government
actions that harmed tribal sacred sites, which thereby interfered with tribal religious
practices.
Bonham, supra note 8, at 165 (footnote omitted).
58. See sources cited supra note 55; see also Rita S. Mandosa, Another Promise Broken,
40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 109, 111 (1993) (“[T]he greatest damage to Native American religious
freedom has come from an April 19, 1988, decision by the United States Supreme Court in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.”); Scott Dalton, Note, Saving Native
American Religious Sites: The Haskell Medicine Wheel, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1995, at
61, 66 (“The Lyng decision conclusively ended any hope by Native Americans with respect to [the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act’s] ability to protect their sacred sites when the Court
found that AIRFA did not ‘create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual
rights.’” (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455)); Johnston, supra note 28, at 450 (stating that the Lyng
decision not only ended the possibility of litigation but made any attempts to pass sacred sites
legislation more difficult because of the Establishment Clause issue).
59. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoted in Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of
Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conflict over Native American
Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 792 (2001).
60. Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 83
(2002) (quoting Joseph W. Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 4 (Charles
Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000)).
61. William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 27
(2002-2003).
62. See Riley, supra note 60, at 93 (“Communal, land-based peoples conceive of and interpret
ownership in ways that are foreign to, and diminished by, Anglo-American property regimes.”);
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“the Anglo-American understanding of land, expressed through a
conventional understanding of doctrinal principles of property law, shapes
the Court’s reading of the facts and adds to the difficulty of seeking a
resolution that might heal the conflict.”63
The concern expressed by Vogel and others is justified. The Lyng
decision was correct because it avoided an undesirable property situation,
but it is also true that under many Indian conceptions of property, such a
predicament would never have developed in the first place.64 But rather
than revealing a problem with judicial sacred sites decisions, this concern
about the Anglo-American values that underlay the Lyng decision actually
supports the proposition that sacred sites determinations should be made by
land management agencies: The Lyng Court’s Anglocentric reasoning is
merely one in a number of striking illustrations of how agencies are better
able to accommodate Indian values and beliefs than the courts or
Congress.65
E. The Limited Ability of Western Property Law To Protect American
Indian Land Rights
Historically, Western conceptions of property have harmed Indians.
The earliest settlers used their understanding of property and ownership to
expropriate tribal lands.66 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, English common law was
used to reach the conclusion that Indian land ownership consisted solely of
the right to sell title to the discovering sovereign.67 Since then, the Court
has repeatedly upheld the imposition of Western property values upon
Indian tribes as a means of determining the future of Indian lands. Yet
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in M’Intosh underscores the unsuitability
of courts for this task. The M’Intosh opinion demonstrates how courts, as
institutions created by the Western legal tradition, cannot escape from
Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property
in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1308 (2001) (“To the extent that courts continue to adjudicate
intercultural claims within the Anglo-American property structure, it becomes important to ensure
that this structure is not being used to unfairly suppress and disregard Native peoples’ interests.”).
63. Vogel, supra note 59, at 783.
64. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87
(1985) (“[S]ome Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of owning the land. Indeed they
prided themselves on not marking the land but rather on moving lightly through it, living with the
land and with its creatures as members of the same family rather than as strangers who visited
only to conquer the objects of nature.”).
65. See infra Part III.
66. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (2000) (noting that “[f]rom the
beginning, English government in the New World refused to recognize the Indians as true title
holders,” that “Virginia’s earliest settlers began to articulate a theoretical basis to deny Indian
title,” and that the Puritans could not accept that hunter-gatherers were “really occupants of their
lands”).
67. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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Western notions of property even when the Court believes those notions
produce unjust results. In M’Intosh, Marshall expressed extreme discomfort
with the position he was expounding, yet considered it unavoidable.68
“Conquest,” he wrote, “gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been
successfully asserted.”69
The inability of Western law and legal institutions to protect native land
rights is similarly demonstrated by the example of the English colonization
of the Maori in New Zealand. In New Zealand, English property law was
imposed on the Maori in order to facilitate land purchases from them.70
Although the English decided to recognize Maori land rights only because
such recognition was less costly than a war, once this decision was made,
the English truly believed it benefited the Maori.71 As Colonial Governor
Thomas Gore Browne acknowledged, in “most colonies of the Crown, the
natives have been recognised as possessing certain possessory rights over
the soil” short of full ownership, while in New Zealand, the Maori had “a
right of proprietorship over their lands—not simply a general right of
dominion, but a right of proprietorship like the landlords of estates.”72 Yet
despite the English colonists’ belief that they were treating the Maori fairly,
the imposition of Western property law still had detrimental consequences
for the Maori people. They “ended up with much less land and very little
money,” and with the loss of their system of property rights “so too went
much of the traditional political structure of the tribes.”73
Thus, considering how even the benevolent—or at least
nonmalicious—imposition of Western notions of property has harmed
native peoples, the continued lack of space for Indian property values in the
Western legal tradition is understandably disconcerting. However, while
Vogel’s criticism implicates court decisions, it does not necessarily apply to
agency decisionmaking. The courts’ use of Western property law to decide
68. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 12 n.5 (5th ed. 2002) (“The
sarcasm and irony seen here and elsewhere in Marshall’s opinion suggest his embarrassment with
what he had to write, and there is independent evidence that he was sympathetic to the plight of
Native Americans.”).
69. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
70. Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New
Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 830-31 (1999) (stating that the decision to “substitute the
English for the Maori system of property ownership” was done to help land “speedily come into
the market and become available for purposes of colonisation” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
71. Id. at 822 (remarking that “[t]he recognition of Maori title was a source of some pride to
colonial government officials” who believed they had treated the Maori with “unvarying
kindness” and that the colonization of New Zealand was achieved according to a “new and
humane system” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 844.
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cases involving Indian sacred sites may be unfortunate, but it is also
unavoidable. These courts were created to implement Anglo-American laws
and are bound by judicial precedent. As a result, it is unlikely that even the
most sympathetic court would consider it appropriate to discard precedent
and incorporate Indian conceptions of property into its sacred sites
decisions. As the Court of Federal Claims stated in Hage v. United States,
“The Anglo-American case precedent is literally made up of tens of
thousands of cases defining property rights over the better part of a
millennium. . . . [J]udicial decision-making builds historically and logically
upon past precedent in narrow cases and controversies rather than current
general exigencies or sweeping political mandates.”74
However, the Hage court also explained that this constraint is solely a
characteristic of the judicial branch, remarking that “[t]he genius of our
Framer[s’] tripartite division of constitutional power is the creation of
separated institutions that each best deal with different categories of
governmental decisions.”75 Agencies do not face the same restrictions as
courts and are consequently much better suited to accommodate Indian
conceptions of property and to use them when making their land-use
determinations. Unlike courts, agencies are in a position to take competing
understandings into account and provide a forum where Indian property
values can have an impact on sacred sites decisions.76 Agencies are required
to consult with Indian tribes when making land-use decisions that will
affect them,77 and through these consultations, agencies are exposed to
alternative conceptions of property. A number of recent examples
demonstrate how such exposure has led some agencies to begin
acknowledging the validity of Indian viewpoints in ways unlikely to ever
occur in a court.
One instance of how such discussions can expose and make agencies
more receptive to Indian understandings of the world can be seen in the
results of a recent conference between New York state agencies and
representatives from New York’s Indian tribes. This conference was held to
discuss various issues including the preservation of Indian sacred sites. At
the conference, the Indian leaders explained a number of misunderstandings
that were hurting the two groups’ ability to cooperate. “One example that
was given was the difference in how the written word is viewed; while
74. 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 151 (1996).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the Park Service’s creation of a voluntary ban on rock climbing during the month of
June, the month when the Cherokee perform their most important religious rituals at the site);
see also Brady, supra note 6, at 169 (noting that Deborah Liggett, Superintendent of Devils
Tower, “was acutely aware of the significance of land to Native American religious practice”);
infra Subsection II.C.1.
77. See infra Section II.A.
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[Anglo-American] society tends to memorialize everything of importance
in writing and attaches great importance to the written word, Native culture
is based on oral traditions, and the spoken word thus assumes great
importance.”78 Such discussions show the potential for agencies to be
influenced by exposure to Indian culture and beliefs and to help them avoid
many of the problems that have arisen in the past, in this instance problems
resulting from the emphasis on oral traditions in Indian culture.79 The
discussions at the New York conference enabled the two groups to achieve
the “first step in establishing a working relationship based on mutual
understanding and respect.”80
An even more striking example can be seen in the litigation over
alleged unauthorized excavation of an Indian village and burial site in
upstate New York. In describing the impact that consultations with the
Seneca tribe about their culture and beliefs had on him, Christopher A.
Amato, Deputy Chief of the New York State Attorney General’s
Environmental Protection Bureau, stated that “an understanding of some of
the traditional religious beliefs of the Senecas helped us to understand how
extremely painful it was for tribal members to learn that the remains of their
ancestors were being treated with disrespect.”81 He further added that
learning about the tribe’s “culture and traditions not only helped frame the
litigation but also formed the cornerstone of successful cooperation by
enabling the parties to bridge cultural differences.”82 As Amato’s
statements suggest, making agency officials aware of the differences
between American Indian and Western cultures increases the likelihood that
agencies will consider these alternative views when working with tribes on
matters of tribal concern.
78. Christopher A. Amato, Speaking with One Voice: Elements of Successful State/Tribal
Collaboration in Environmental Enforcement, NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 2002, at 3,
12 n.16.
79. A good example of this conflict can be seen in a 1976 suit brought by the Mashpee Indian
tribe under the Nonintercourse Act. The Mashpee claimed that their tribal land had been taken
without federal consent, but the district court dismissed the suit because the Mashpee failed to
meet the definition of “tribe of Indians” under the Act. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447
F. Supp. 940, 950 (D. Mass. 1978), aff’d sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592
F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979). One of the biggest problems for the Mashpee was the fact that although
the tribe claimed to have been continuously self-governing, its claim lacked documentary support.
According to one commentator,
Some observers felt the court and jury in Mashpee Tribe heard these oral histories
merely as “gaps” in the evidentiary record. “The stories that members of the Mashpee
Tribe told were stories that legal ears could not hear. Thus the legal requirements of
relevance rendered the Indian storytellers mute and the culture they were portraying
invisible.”
Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 203, 224 n.133 (2003-2004) (quoting Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating
Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 649).
80. Amato, supra note 78, at 5.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
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Therefore, although Lyng precluded the judicial protection sought by
sacred sites advocates, the decision actually made it more likely that land
management decisions would be influenced by Indian conceptions of
property. The statutory consultation provisions created in response to the
lack of judicial protection for sacred sites helped to pave the way for federal
land agencies to better understand and accommodate tribal interests in their
sacred sites. Since Lyng, agencies like the Park Service, the Forest Service,
and the Bureau of Land Management have all increasingly sought ways to
protect many of the Indian sacred sites located on federal lands and to
accommodate the religious and cultural practices associated with them.83
II. THE EFFECTS OF PLACING SACRED SITES
MANAGEMENT IN AGENCY HANDS
After Lyng, it became clear that the courts would not mandate
protection for Indian sacred sites, and that the majority of such sites would
only be protected if federal land management agencies decided that they
should be. Although most commentators have been pessimistic about
agency protection, largely because “such accommodation is to be had only
at the sufferance of the dominant culture, which does not go very far in
honoring and respecting the diversity found in Native American culture,”84
the actual results have been quite different than those commonly
predicted.85 Contrary to the fears expressed by many, agencies are affording
real protection to Indian sacred sites. Leaving these decisions in the hands
of agencies may actually be the best solution for society in general, even if
most tribes would still prefer complete control of these decisions.
While it is unclear how much cases like Lyng directly influenced land
management agencies, such judicial decisions affected Congress, and in
turn Congress influenced the agencies. Supreme Court cases like Lyng and
Employment Division v. Smith86 revealed the lack of judicial protections
83. See infra Sections II.B-C.
84. Vogel, supra note 59, at 789.
85. For examples of such negative predictions, see id. See also Russel L. Barsh, Grounded
Visions: Native American Conceptions of Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
127, 143-53 (2000) (arguing that the danger faced by Indian sacred sites is that their protection is
left too much up to “agency discretion”); Kristen L. Boyles, Note, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989
Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117,
1118 (1991) (“Government agencies frequently make public land management decisions that
affect Indian sacred sites located on federal land without considering Indian religion. This lack of
cultural sensitivity continually threatens the practice of Indian religion.” (footnote omitted));
Luralene D. Tapahe, Comment, After the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal
Protection for First American Worshipers, 24 N.M. L. REV. 331, 347 n.72 (1994) (arguing that a
stronger sacred sites statute would be the most effective way to prevent “agencies [from] harming
sacred sites through development on federal land”).
86. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a statute forbidding use of peyote, a drug that plays a
central role in worship for the Native American Church, did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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afforded to Indian religious practices and sacred sites, and convinced
Congress of the need to enact greater legislative protections. As a result, a
number of statutes were passed or amended with the goal of aiding Indian
religious and cultural preservation. In 1992, Congress amended the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966;87 it did the same in
1988 for the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979.88 It
also passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.89
These acts have had a discernible influence on sacred sites protection.
However, they are frequently overlooked because, as many critics have
pointed out, the legal duties they impose are not particularly onerous.90
A. The Enforceability of Statutory Consultation Provisions
Commentators are making a mistake when they dismiss these statutes
simply because they create few legal duties. Regardless of the paucity of
statutory requirements and the ease with which they can be satisfied, this
legislation has changed agency conceptions of their role with regard to the
protection of Indian culture and religion. All of these acts make it clear that
Congress expects land management agencies to listen to Indian concerns
and try to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect their sacred
sites.
The 1992 NHPA amendments, for example, require that the national
preservation program be conducted “in partnership with” affected “Indian
tribes.”91 In interpreting this provision, agencies have understood their
obligations under NHPA as
requir[ing] the agency official to consult with any Indian tribe or
Native Hawaiian organization that attaches religious and cultural
87. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XL,
106 Stat. 4600, 4753-65 (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1988)).
88. Amendments to Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 100-588,
§ 1(d), 102 Stat. 2983, 2983 (1988) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988)).
89. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.).
90. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 85, at 137-38 (“Each of these laws has significant
limitations.”); Brady, supra note 6, at 173 (“[T]he legislation that has passed has generally been of
little practical import.”).
91. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4002 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 470-1(2) (2000)). The amendments also inserted “Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations,” id., into the list of groups the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation must
“assist . . . to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities,” 16 U.S.C.
§ 470-1(6). It should be noted, however, that prior to Lyng the 1980 amendments to NHPA
announced that “[i]t shall be the policy of the Federal Government” to act “in partnership with the
States, local governments, Indian tribes, and private organizations and individuals.” National
Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 101, 94 Stat. 2987, 2988
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470-1). The 1980 amendments also required the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation to “inform and educate . . . Indian tribes . . . as to the Council’s
authorized activities.” Id. § 301(g)(1), 94 Stat. at 2999 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470j(a)(7)).
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significance to historic properties that may be affected by an
undertaking. This requirement applies regardless of the location of
the historic property. Such Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization shall be a consulting party.92
Furthermore, agencies are required to ensure that such consultation
provides an Indian tribe with “reasonable opportunity to identify its
concerns about historic properties, advise on the identification and
evaluation of historic properties, including those of traditional religious and
cultural importance, articulate its views on the undertaking’s effects on
such properties, and participate in the resolution of adverse effects.”93 The
regulations further provide that agencies must “make a reasonable and good
faith effort to identify Indian tribes” that should be consulted and that
“[c]onsultation should commence early in the planning process, in order to
identify and discuss relevant preservation issues and resolve concerns about
the confidentiality of information on historic properties.”94
1. The Influence of Legislation on Agency Protection of Sacred Sites
The 1992 NHPA amendments also had an important effect on agency
interpretation of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.95
Although no amendments to NFMA forced agencies to reinterpret the Act,
the experience of enforcing the 1992 NHPA amendments influenced
agency conceptions of their role with regard to the management of Indian
sacred sites in other contexts. This voluntary reinterpretation signals a
striking change in agency attitudes toward sacred sites.
NFMA itself simply states that the Forest Service must provide for
“public participation in the planning for and management of the National
Forest System.”96 Before Lyng, agency regulations required that Indian
tribes be notified when tribal lands or treaty rights were expected to be
impacted by Forest Service decisions, and the regulations stated that the
agency was to “coordinate regional and forest planning with the equivalent
and related planning efforts of . . . Indian tribes.”97 However, these
regulations only briefly acknowledged the special concerns of Indian tribes.
This cursory treatment changed in 2000, as evidenced by the fact that
Indian concerns were given their own section in the National Forest System
Land and Resource Management Planning subpart of the Code of Federal
92. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii) (2004).
93. Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A).
94. Id.
95. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1602(b).
97. 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(a) (1984) (amended 2000).
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Regulations, entitled “Interaction with American Indian tribes.”98 This
section now requires the Forest Service to
consult with and invite American Indian tribes . . . to participate in
the planning process to assist in:
(1) The early identification of treaty rights, treaty-protected
resources, and American Indian tribe trust resources;
(2) The consideration of tribal data and resource knowledge
provided by tribal representatives; and
(3) The consideration of tribal concerns and suggestions
during decisionmaking.99
Like NHPA, ARPA was also amended after Lyng. ARPA had already
required consultation with Indian tribes under the terms of the original 1979
Act,100 but was amended to include the establishment of “a program to
increase public awareness of the significance of the archaeological
resources located on . . . Indian lands and the need to protect such
resources.”101
Lastly, RFRA was passed in 1993, in direct response to Smith,102 and
states that the government can only “substantially burden” the exercise of
religion when it has relied on the least restrictive means possible to further
a compelling governmental interest.103

98. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514,
67,573 (Nov. 9, 2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.15 (2004)).
99. 36 C.F.R. § 219.15(c).
100. Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, § 10(a), 93 Stat.
721, 727 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a)) (requiring agencies to promulgate
regulations under the Act only “after consultation with . . . Indian tribes”). Since the passage of
the Act, the same section of ARPA also has required agencies to consider the provisions of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, which mandates that
it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions
of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996.
101. Amendments to Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 100-588,
§ 1(d), 102 Stat. 2983, 2983 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 470ii(c)). The amendments
also originally required land managers to report to Congress on their efforts, id., but this provision
was repealed by the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-333, § 814(d)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 4093, 4196 (partially repealing 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(c) (1994)).
102. See Todd L. Tisdale, Culture v. Conservation: Does a Proposed Special Regulation
Threaten the Integrity of the National Park System?, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 111, 130
(2001).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2000). In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that RFRA
as applied to state governments was an unconstitutional extension of federal power. 521 U.S. 507
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NHPA, NFMA, and ARPA all have been interpreted to require agency
consultation with affected tribes. Although these statutes and interpretive
regulations only mandate discussions with affected tribes and do not force
agencies to adopt a tribe’s position, they reveal Congress’s intention that
agencies seriously consider Indian interests in their management decisions.
Furthermore, although the courts, as demonstrated in Lyng, will not
mandate agency accommodation, they will enforce the statutory
consultation provisions as well as agency interpretations of these
provisions.
2. The Importance of the Courts in Agency Protection of Sacred Sites
In Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, the Tenth Circuit held that the
Forest Service’s requests for specific information about tribal cultural
activities through form letters and at tribal meetings were not reasonable
efforts to identify historic properties in the Las Huertas Canyon area as
required by NHPA.104 According to the court, “[T]he agency did not
reasonably pursue the information necessary to evaluate the canyon’s
eligibility for inclusion in the National Register.”105 Because the Sandia
court found that the “Forest Service’s efforts were neither reasonable nor in
good faith,”106 the court reversed the district court’s denial of the tribe’s
request for declarative and injunctive relief and remanded the case. Sandia
demonstrates that the “teeth” in these statutes is the requirement that
agencies must listen to Indian concerns.
More recently, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, the
Ninth Circuit held not only that consultation with affected tribes is required,
but also that the results of such consultation will be enforced.107 In
Muckleshoot, the court agreed that before initiating the disputed land
exchange, the Forest Service had made a “reasonable and good faith effort
to identify historic properties” as required by NHPA.108 However, the court
held that since consultation with the tribe had informed the agency of the
significance of “an important tribal ancestral transportation route,” and had
convinced the agency of the trail’s importance, the agency was required to
adequately protect the trail from the possible adverse effects of the land

(1997). Subsequent cases, however, have upheld the Act as applied to the federal government.
See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
104. 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
105. Id. at 860.
106. Id. at 857.
107. 177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 807.
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exchange.109 In light of this obligation, the court found the agency’s
attempts to protect the trail inadequate, enjoined the land exchange, and
remanded the case with instructions to the Forest Service “to reconsider
whether it [had] located all of the historic properties on the lands it
propose[d] to transfer out of federal ownership and what protections should
be required.”110 As Muckleshoot shows, judicial enforcement does not end
with statutory consultation requirements: Courts will also enforce those
regulations that require agencies to act on the information received from
such consultations.
One can even see the willingness of courts to enforce agency
consultation with tribes in cases decided before statutes like NHPA
specifically addressed the issue. In Attakai v. United States, the Navajo
Nation brought suit to enjoin the construction of fences and livestock
watering facilities on the Hopi Indian Reservation.111 The Navajo objected
because they had not been consulted about the development, despite the fact
that the lands involved were of historic interest to the tribe.112 The court
agreed and enjoined the Bureau of Indian Affairs from proceeding with the
development. The court found that the agency had acted “contrary to the
letter and spirit of the regulations,” which were promulgated in order to
include Indian tribes in decisions regarding historic properties.113 The
regulations stated that, “[w]hen an undertaking may affect properties of
historic significance to an Indian tribe on non-Indian land,” that tribe must
have “the opportunity to participate.”114 According to the court, “[T]he
regulations clearly contemplate[d] participation by Indian tribes regarding
lands beyond their own reservations.”115 Consequently, the court held that
the Navajo needed to be given the “opportunity to participate as interested
persons.”116
In addition to courts, scholars have also acknowledged the importance
of consultation between agencies and tribes. Professor Dean Suagee,
Director of the First Nations Environmental Law Program at Vermont Law
School, characterized consultation provisions as the “the right to have a seat
at the table, a chance to persuade the responsible federal official to do the
right thing.”117 As Suagee recognized, this right is extremely important. By
109. Id. The court cited the then-current regulations and held that the steps the Forest Service
had taken to mitigate the adverse effects of the exchange did not “ensure preservation of the
property’s significant historic features.” Id. at 808.
110. Id. at 815.
111. 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990).
112. Id. at 1405.
113. Id. at 1408.
114. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(c)(2)(iii) (1990), quoted in Attakai, 746 F. Supp. at 1408.
115. Attakai, 746 F. Supp. at 1408.
116. Id. at 1409.
117. Dean B. Suagee, Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic Preservation
Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 86, 88 (2002).
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guaranteeing that tribes will be able to alert agencies to their concerns,
these statutes and regulations greatly increase tribes’ ability to influence
agency decisions.
Although access to agencies does not guarantee that a tribe will be able
to influence agency decisions, both agencies and sacred sites supporters
frequently acknowledge the importance of such consultations. In his article
Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes, Derek Haskew described the
competing views of agency consultation and the situations in which
consultation is most likely to be effective.118 According to Haskew, one
view of consultations “is that government recognizes the wisdom of
considering the unique perspectives of Native Americans during policy
debate, and is making every effort to incorporate those views and interests
in federal planning.”119 The other view is that the consultation provisions
“may confuse the real consent of Indian communities to federal actions
with the procedural illusion of participation, in which Indian consent is
never really asked for, and advice is never really heeded.”120 After a
thorough examination of the consultation case law, Haskew concluded that
both views are correct in certain circumstances, but that consultation can be
expected to work best in situations where courts can legitimately find that
“a statutorily created consultation requirement demand[s] something more
than a consultation rendered meaningless.”121 Therefore, consultation may
be particularly suited for use in the sacred sites context. According to
Haskew, sacred sites cases like Sandia show that the combination of a
statutory consultation provision and the courts’ willingness to enforce it
ensures that federal agents will not “ignore the information provided” by
tribes when making their land management decisions.122
Such judicial willingness to enforce consultation requirements in
statutes like NHPA ensures that tribes will have a chance to influence
agency decisions. If necessary, a tribe can bring an agency to court for
consultation violations. This ability in turn provides an effective check
against agency abuse of discretion in general and answers one of the
persistent criticisms of agency decisionmaking, which is that Congress

118. Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21 (19992000).
119. Id. at 24.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 71.
122. Id. at 72. But see id. at 74 (stating that consultation provides the “opportunity for Native
Americans to express their opinions and desires—with no guarantee that their input will be fully
considered or even respected”); see also Robert A. Destro, “By What Right?”: The Sources
and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters “Touching Religion,”
29 IND. L. REV. 1, 30 n.135 (1995) (arguing that “neither the states nor the federal government
take their respective obligations . . . very seriously . . . . especially if such an obligation would
interfere with agency discretion”).
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cannot closely monitor every agency decision. As critics rightly note,
Congress must rely on external groups to alert it to agency abuses, and
“[o]nly when they hear such an alarm will members of Congress turn their
attention to the problem.”123 However, cases such as Sandia provide the
necessary alarm; they make agency abuses more visible and help alert
Congress to these problems.
The consultation provisions in statutes like the NHPA and courts’
proven willingness to enforce them have increased the feasibility of
informing Congress of agency abuses. In his testimony before Congress,
William Day, Chairman of the Culture and Heritage Committee of the
United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., alerted Congress to instances of
agency abuse by citing Sandia and similar cases and comparing the facts of
those cases to the FCC’s current failure to consult with tribal governments
before constructing cell phone towers on Indian sacred lands. Day used
these cases to demonstrate his belief that the “FCC has been unwilling to
live up to its consultation obligations both under the National Historic
Preservation Act and the Trust Responsibility to Tribes,” and that
congressional oversight was needed to curb these abuses.124
3. The Importance of Environmental Groups
The effectiveness of consultation may also be strengthened by the
support of environmental groups for tribal efforts to protect sacred sites.
These groups have both the experience and financial resources to enable
them to negotiate effectively with agencies and, when necessary, to bring
abuses of agency discretion to Congress’s attention. For example, in
Sandia, the Pueblo of Sandia was joined by the Sandoval Environmental
Action Community, Earth First!, the Sandia Mountain Wildlife and
Conservation Club, the Sierra Club, and Wildlife Rescue of New Mexico in
bringing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.125 The added
resources and expertise of groups such as these improve the effectiveness of
both tribal consultation with agencies and litigation to enforce consultation
provisions.126 As a result, the combination of the statutes’ consultation
123. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1298 (2001).
124. Telecom Carriers, Tribal Government, and the Siting of Communications Towers:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs & the Communications Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 20317157 (statement
of William Day, Chairman, Culture and Heritage Committee, United South and Eastern Tribes,
Inc.).
125. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
126. The importance of the aid provided by these environmental groups may also be gleaned
from cases in which these groups have argued against tribes, most notably cases concerning
traditional tribal uses of endangered animals. In these cases, tribes have frequently lost the right to
use these animals even when they were shown to be an integral part of the Indian tribes’ religion
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provisions, the courts’ willingness to enforce them, and the desire of
outside groups to use their resources and expertise to bring abuses to the
courts’ and Congress’s attention has ensured that the right to consultation
with agencies is a meaningful one.
4. Executive Influence on the Protection of Sacred Sites
In addition, President Clinton shared Congress’s concern regarding the
protection of Indian culture and sacred sites in the wake of Lyng, and in
1996 he issued Executive Order 13,007, providing that federal agencies
“(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by
Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical
integrity of such sacred sites.”127 Like the congressional statutes, Executive
Order 13,007 may not create onerous legal duties,128 but together the
statutes and the Order send a clear message to land management agencies
that it is their role to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect
sacred sites. To the surprise of many, the agencies have listened.
B. The Effectiveness of Consultation Provisions
The management plan the Park Service created for Rainbow Bridge
National Monument provides a good example of the influence of statutory
provisions requiring accommodation or consultation. The Park Service
issued its management plan for Rainbow Bridge in direct response to
Executive Order 13,007 and cited the Order in deciding that Rainbow
Bridge was eligible for listing as a national historic place. The agency’s
eligibility determination was based on criteria very similar to the
requirements of Executive Order 13,007.129 Furthermore, in Natural Arch &
and culture. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (finding congressional intent in
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt eagles); United
States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that burdens on Native American religion
imposed by the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act were warranted, as the Act served a
compelling government interest); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975)
(upholding tribal whaling rights but with significant limitations); United States v. Billie, 667 F.
Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the Endangered Species Act abrogated Indian
treaty rights to hunt the endangered Florida panther).
127. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,771 (May 29, 1996).
128. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 172 (“The Order, however, incorporates qualifying
language that limits federal land management agency implementation of the objectives to
situations where it is ‘not clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions’ and only ‘to the
extent practicable.’ Executive Order 13,007, therefore, is largely a hortatory and aspirational
expression of government policy.” (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. at 26,771));
Tisdale, supra note 102, at 132-33 (“While these statements by the past Administration
established a general policy approach for departments and agencies in the Executive Branch, they
do not carry the force of law; nor can they override existing laws.”).
129. The reviewing court commented on this connection by first describing the 1996
Executive Order and then stating:
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Bridge Society v. Alston, the case that resulted from the controversy over
this management plan, the Park Service recognized it had a duty to consider
Indian interests in its management plans, regardless of whether or not it
actually had a legal obligation to do anything more than hear them.130
Legislation such as the 1992 NHPA amendments, regulations such as those
implementing NFMA, and Executive Order 13,007 appear to have given the
Park Service and other land agencies this new conception of their role. Not
only are land agencies becoming more willing to accommodate and protect
Indian sacred sites, but the protection they are providing can often be quite
effective. In fact, in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, it was only
because the Park Service wanted to implement strong protection for Bear
Lodge that the agency found itself involved in a lawsuit.131
C. The Legality of Agency Accommodation
Suits such as Bear Lodge, brought by non-Indian groups who believe
that agency accommodation has gone too far, show that the dismissive
attitude expressed by many toward agency accommodation has been
undeserved. Increasingly, agencies are now under fire because of their
willingness to consider Indian interests in the sites they manage. Although
Lyng stated that agency accommodation was desirable, as soon as agencies
began to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect sacred sites,
they were once again faced with First Amendment challenges—this time
from those who argued that accommodations represented the impermissible
establishment of Indian religion over all others.132 Thus far, such suits have
proved unsuccessful.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits Congress
from making laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” However, the
Supreme Court has also made it clear that the Establishment Clause does
not require “‘callous indifference’” to religion.133 Although the Constitution
prohibits the endorsement of religion, it also “affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions.”134
Interestingly, in the early 1990s, the National Park Service requested that the Utah State
Historic Preservation Officer (“USHPO”) make a determination of eligibility of
Rainbow Bridge for the National Register of Historic Places as a site that has cultural
significance based on its traditional and sacred values to Native Americans.
Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 n.11 (D. Utah 2002), aff’d,
No. 02-4099, 2004 WL 569888 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004) (unpublished decision). The court then
juxtaposed this decision with the requirements of Executive Order 13,007. Id.
130. Id. at 1225-26.
131. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
132. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 166.
133. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952)).
134. Id.
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The meaning of the Establishment Clause is hotly contested. If the
Constitution mandates separation between government and religion, then
any accommodation of religion by the government would seem to violate
the First Amendment. This is the view of strict separationists. They believe
that any governmental accommodation is impermissible, and they base their
interpretation of the Establishment Clause on statements of Founding
Fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, who demanded “‘the total separation of
the anciently meshed powers of church and state.’”135
Others interpret the Establishment Clause as requiring accommodation.
Accomodationists reconcile the prohibition against religious establishment
by differentiating between types of accommodation. For them,
The key difference between legitimate accommodation and
impermissible “establishment” is that the former merely removes
obstacles to the exercise of a religious conviction adopted for
reasons independent of the government’s action, while the latter
creates an incentive or inducement (in the strong form, a
compulsion) to adopt that practice or conviction.136
The question for accommodationists is thus whether a given
accommodation simply removes obstacles to religious observance or
actively encourages such observance.
The Establishment Clause issue is further complicated by the fact that,
in other contexts, constitutional provisions have been held to apply
differently to Indians because of the special relationship between Indian
tribes and the U.S. government. This special relationship gives Congress
the authority to develop exemptions and preferences for Indians that might
otherwise be unconstitutional. In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court
held that “[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”137 Based on this special
relationship, Congress has the authority to provide special protections for
Indians that might otherwise violate the Establishment Clause, and thus
agency accommodation of Indian religious practices is less likely raise
constitutional concerns than the same accommodation for other religious
groups.
135. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987
UTAH L. REV. 895, 913 (quoting FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY
129 (1974)).
136. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992).
137. 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (holding that the hiring policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
which gave preference to American Indians, was not a racial preference, but instead was a
preference based on membership in a quasi-sovereign group that has a special relationship with
the United States).
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In other situations, the federal-tribal relationship has been used
successfully to defend statutory exemptions against Establishment Clause
challenges.138 A number of current federal statutes reflect this intuition. For
example, “members of the Native American Church (Indians who use
peyote as a sacrament) are exempt from criminal penalties for the
possession of peyote.”139 Similarly, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act prohibits the possession of eagles or eagle parts, but authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to make an exception for Indian religious purposes
under certain circumstances.140 Therefore, even if federal accommodation
of Indian sacred sites would violate the Establishment Clause under normal
circumstances, exceptions for Indians are likely constitutional.
1. The Conflict over the Management of Bear Lodge/Devils Tower
Devils Tower National Monument, known to Indians as Bear Lodge, is
located in northeastern Wyoming and is a natural phenomenon with great
historical and religious significance. President Roosevelt dedicated the
tower in 1906 as the first national monument.141 Thousands of visitors come
each year to view the monument, and some come to climb it, since Devils
Tower is considered one of the best rock-climbing locations in the world.142
For many Indian tribes, however, Devils Tower is a sacred site. According
to religious legend, seven sisters took refuge from a pursuing bear at the
tower. There they prayed for the rock’s aid, the rock began to grow, and
when it reached the sky, the girls turned into the seven stars of the Big
Dipper.143
These different meanings, one recreational and the other religious, have
led to conflict over the management of the tower. Many visitors come
hundreds or thousands of miles to climb the tower, but Indian tribes view
such climbing as sacrilege and want it to stop. Sensitive to these conflicting
concerns, the Park Service attempted to devise a land management plan that
could accommodate the varying interests. The Park Service initiated and
completed a collaborative process that involved both groups, climbers and
tribes. After much time and thought, the Service implemented a plan it
hoped would be acceptable to all users of the site. The Park Service’s plan
called for a voluntary ban on all climbing during the month of June, the
138. See Brent Gunson, Cultural Tug of Wars: An Analysis of the Legal Issues Involving the
NPS Proposed Rule To Allow the Taking of Golden Eagles at Wupatki National Monument for
Religious Purposes, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 399, 416-17 (2002).
139. Lydia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the Establishment Clause: Indian Religious
Practices on Federal Lands, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 23 (1997).
140. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2000).
141. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 1999).
142. Brady, supra note 6, at 166.
143. Bonham, supra note 8, at 158.
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peak month for Indian religious ceremonies at the tower, but permitted
climbing throughout the rest of the year.144 The plan also prohibited
climbers from adding new bolts and fixed pitons, or new routes needing
either, and it required camouflaged climbing equipment.145
Most of the climbing community accepted the voluntary ban, but a
small group of mostly commercial climbing outfits challenged it as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.146 The district court upheld the
voluntary ban147 as “a legitimate exercise of the Secretary of the Interior’s
discretion in managing the Monument.”148 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court’s decision on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing.149 The key aspect for both courts was the voluntary nature of the
ban.150
Bear Lodge—and the other cases discussed below—demonstrate that
agencies are not only willing to make serious efforts to accommodate
Indian interests at sacred sites, but also that these accommodations will be
upheld by the courts. Although the ban was voluntary and hence lacked
formal enforcement measures, it was highly respected and effective.151
Tribal members have strongly approved of it. Charlotte Black Elk, who
lives on the Pine Ridge Reservation, indicated that reducing the number of
climbers on the tower, especially during the June ceremonies, created “a
more suitable atmosphere for prayer,” stating that “[b]efore the current June
arrangement, we had people looking over the tower at us, (which was)
distracting.”152 Similarly, Elaine Quiver, a Lakota Sioux who also lives on
the Pine Ridge Reservation, said that “the voluntary closure is a good
compromise that allows climbers and Native Americans to both use [Bear
Lodge]. She said the ceremonies performed in the monument have served to
heal Lakota culture, which she said has been overrun by modern American
culture.”153
144. See Brady, supra note 6, at 168.
145. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 182.
146. Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public
Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 459 (2002). The plaintiffs challenged the law in part because
they worried the Park Service would make the ban mandatory if the voluntary ban did not have
the desired effect. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820.
147. The original plan also banned commercial permits during June, but that aspect was
eliminated when it appeared the court would strike it down. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 183-84.
148. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1457 (D. Wyo. 1998),
aff’d, 175 F.3d 814.
149. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d 814.
150. See id. at 821-22; Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455-56.
151. Two years after the voluntary ban was enacted, the number of climbers at Devils Tower
during the month of June had decreased from 1294 to 193. Karen J. Coates, Stairway to Heaven;
When a Climbing Mecca Is Also a Sacred Site, SIERRA, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 27, 28.
152. Jim Hughes, Devils Tower a Monument to Clash of Cultures; Indians Resent Climbers
at Site Shrouded in Myth, DENVER POST, July 5, 1998, at B5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Jim Hughes, Devils Tower Deal Resolves Dispute; Most Climbers Heed Voluntary June
Ban, DENVER POST, July 13, 1997, at B3, 1997 WL 6079166.
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2. Further First Amendment Challenges
Cases after Bear Lodge have confirmed agency willingness to
accommodate tribal concerns, the effectiveness of this accommodation, and
courts’ readiness to uphold such accommodation. Shortly after the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Bear Lodge, similar litigation was brought against the
National Park Service in Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston.154
Plaintiffs challenged the Park Service’s policy of informing tourists of the
sacredness of Rainbow Bridge to local tribes and asking them not to walk
under it. Natural Arch & Bridge Society is especially interesting given the
fact that twenty years earlier, in Badoni v. Higginson,155 the Park Service
had been taken to court because of its callous indifference to the religious
significance of Rainbow Bridge. Now it was being sued for providing too
much accommodation. Few cases demonstrate a more dramatic change in
agency policy. In Natural Arch & Bridge Society, the plaintiffs argued that
the accommodation, which included erecting barriers and posting signs
requesting visitors not to walk under the bridge, went too far. Although the
case was dismissed for failure to properly join defendants, the court made it
clear that had it reached the merits, the accommodation would have been
upheld.156
Courts have also upheld agency decisions to accommodate Indian
sacred sites in situations quite different from these voluntary ban cases. A
recent example is Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,
in which a timber company challenged both the adoption of a historic
preservation plan for the Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark by
the Forest Service as well as the Forest Service’s decision to withdraw a
timber sale.157 The Medicine Wheel is a prehistoric circular structure of
rocks located in Big Horn National Forest in north-central Wyoming, and is
considered sacred by numerous Indian tribes.158 The Medicine Wheel was
designated a national historic landmark in 1969, but by the late 1980s the
increasing numbers of visitors to the Medicine Wheel convinced the Forest
Service that it needed to implement a management plan to better protect the
site.159
After much consultation with affected parties, the Forest Service
adopted a management plan within the framework of its obligations under
the National Historic Preservation Act.160 The Forest Service’s decision was
154. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002), aff’d, No. 02-4099, 2004 WL 569888 (10th Cir.
Mar. 23, 2004) (unpublished decision).
155. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
156. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1223-26.
157. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001).
158. Id. at 1286.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1287.
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also guided by other laws, such as the Antiquities Act of 1906;161 the
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935;162 the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978;163 ARPA;164 and Executive Order
13,007.165 In order to comply with its management plan, the Forest Service
cancelled a proposed sale of timber because of concerns that the sale would
adversely impact the Medicine Wheel site.166 The plaintiff in Wyoming
Sawmills challenged this decision, alleging that the Forest Service plan
“wrongfully promote[d] religion in violation of the establishment clause
because promoting the Indian religion was a motivating factor behind [the
Forest Service’s] decision to enact the [preservation plan].”167
The court disagreed, once again holding that agency accommodation of
Indian sacred sites does not violate the Establishment Clause. The plaintiff
claimed that the Forest Service regulation prevented it from freely using
public areas and that it was offended by the religious symbolism that the
regulation advanced.168 However, the court found that the plan did not
advance any religious symbolism: “Unlike the cases Sawmills cited, the
[preservation plan] did not erect any religious symbol anywhere in Big
Horn National Forest.”169 In addition, the court questioned whether a “for
profit corporation has the capacity to be offended.”170 As a result, the court
held that Sawmills lacked the “necessary elements of an injury” to establish
standing.171 The court also found that even if Sawmills’s injuries were
sufficient for standing, the elements of causation and redressability were

161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000). The Act authorizes the President “in his discretion, to
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monuments.” Id. § 431.
162. Id. §§ 461-467. For a discussion of the Act, see Joe P. Yeager, Federal Preservation
Laws: Sites, Structures & Objects, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 383 (2002). As Yeager writes,
Although the Historic Sites Act of 1935 provided the Secretary of the Interior with the
authority to set up programs for landmark preservation, such as the National Historic
Landmark Program, the Act has been attacked for a failure to clarify what procedures
govern how a historic property is acquired and designated as a historic landmark. The
Historic Sites Act has also been criticized for its failure to integrate historic
preservation concerns into federal agency departments, which would arguably provide
for better management and enforcement. Nevertheless, the Act remains in force at
present, though clearly overshadowed and outdated . . . [by] the National Historic
Preservation Act.
Id. at 389-90 (footnotes omitted).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm.
165. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 29, 1996).
166. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (D. Wyo. 2001).
167. Id. at 1290.
168. Id. at 1293 (“[The company] claims that it has suffered an injury because it has come in
direct contact with unwelcomed religious symbolism endorsed by the United States.”).
169. Id. at 1294.
170. Id. at 1295.
171. Id. at 1294.
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not satisfied.172 It made clear that, even if it was the Medicine Wheel itself
that offended Sawmills, the court “could not redress that injury because
striking down the [preservation plan] would not do away with the Medicine
Wheel.”173 In the two claims for which the court found standing, the court
upheld the agency accommodation. Once again, in a situation in which a
land agency had made the determination to protect a sacred site and had
done so in conformance with what it believed were its regulatory and
statutory obligations, the court found the accommodation constitutional.174
D. Why Agency Accommodation Is a Permanent Change
While these cases demonstrate that agency accommodation has
increased in recent years, much of this accommodation occurred under the
Clinton Administration, which was highly receptive to sacred sites
protection. One of the concerns with agency accommodation for sacred
sites, as opposed to statutory or judicial protection, is its potential
susceptibility to change across administrations. Many question whether
agencies will protect sacred sites under presidents who are less sympathetic
to Indian interests.175 Although it is still too soon to tell, changes in
administration do not appear to have greatly affected the recent trend
toward greater sacred sites protection, in part because of the numerous acts
requiring agency consultation with affected tribes and the courts’
willingness to enforce these requirements. The procedural rights guaranteed
in these statutes have been turned into significant protections by tribes and
other sacred sites supporters who, in exercising these rights, have changed
the way in which land management decisions are made.
The commitment to agency accommodation is demonstrated by the fact
that the change in administrations has not dampened efforts to seek out
tribal opinions. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers was recently
told by the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that it has a
duty to protect Indian graves and sacred sites when conducting dam and

172. Id. at 1296-97.
173. Id. at 1295.
174. In this case, the Forest Service even consulted with Sawmills and gave it the opportunity
to participate in the planning process. For example, the Forest Service gave Sawmills “a draft of
the proposed vegetation and timber management sections of the proposed [preservation plan] to
review” and asked Sawmills “to participate and attend future information sharing meetings.” Id. at
1303-04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. See, e.g., Mandosa, supra note 58, at 110 (arguing that “[w]ith the new Republican
administration in the 1980’s, a climate more favorable to business interests prevailed, and the
government ceased promoting Indian religious freedoms, which often conflicted with economic
goals”); see also Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and
Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381, 410 n.167
(1998) (stating that “it is not uncommon for executive orders [directed at agencies] to be short
lived” because of “a subsequent change in administration or administrative policy”).
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river operations.176 In response to this advice, the Corps promised to
incorporate the obligation to protect Indian sacred sites into its new master
manual governing all river operations. Such a decision shows that the Corps
considers the protection of sacred sites to be a permanent obligation. The
Corps “seem[s] more ready to listen and work with you than ever before,”
said Tony Provost, environmental director of the Omaha tribe in
Nebraska.177
Other agencies have also made changes that will have similar impacts
well into the future. As tribes have made a greater effort to inform land
management agencies about their sacred sites, agencies have become more
willing to incorporate this information into their future plans. For instance,
as a result of agency identification of sacred sites and consultation with
Indian tribes, the Six Rivers National Forest (the location of the proposed
road at the core of the Lyng controversy) now has a management plan
providing a buffer zone around the sacred site in order to “minimize
potential conflict with other uses, and to preserve the ceremonial values of
the areas.”178 Such management plans have an obvious influence on future
land management decisions, making it less likely that agency decisions will
vary significantly with changes in administration.
However, the greatest indication of permanent change may be the
increased willingness of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the
agency most frequently blamed for indifference toward and destruction of
Indian Sacred Sites,179 to consider Indian interests in its land management
decisions. Two recent decisions illustrate this point.
In February 2001, the BLM granted Anschutz Exploration Corporation
a permit to drill an exploratory well in Weatherman Draw, Montana, an
area identified by several Indian tribes as having religious significance. At
the time the permit was granted, the BLM had determined that the well
would cause no significant impact on any Indian sacred sites. In response to
this decision, several tribes filed requests for state director review. These
requests were granted and oral presentations were made to the agency.
Although further review upheld the permit, additional constraints were
added on top of its original restrictions, which had already included
prohibitions on any activity “during the periods of April 15 to May 16 and
September 15 to October 15 when the area is used for Native American
176. Bill Lambrecht, Talks About Sacred Sites Go Well, Say Corps, Tribes; Indians Describe
Grief at Looting and Erosion Along Missouri River, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2003,
at A1.
177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Grimm, supra note 139, at 24.
179. See, e.g., Native American Sacred Places: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 108th Cong. 57 (2003) (statement of Suzan Shown Harjo, President, The Morning Star
Institute) (singling out the BLM as having a “record of permitting desecration and destruction of
sacred places”).
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religious ceremonies.”180 The agency also added the requirement that “an
archeologist . . . be on site whenever soil is disturbed, and oil field workers
will not be allowed into areas with archeological sites,” and the assurance
that “[t]he well would be a quarter-mile from the nearest eligible cultural
site.”181
Such provisions and restrictions show a continuing awareness and
concern for Indian sacred sites. In addition, the Anschutz case also
demonstrates the power of consultation. After the permit was upheld, the
BLM agreed to further consultations with the affected tribes. A meeting
was arranged between the BLM, the tribes, and Anschutz in which “the
parties agreed to meet again to work on a negotiated resolution of the
matter.”182 This meeting was only the first of many in which Anschutz, the
BLM, and the tribes worked together to reach a compromise regarding the
future of these lands. In April 2002, after numerous meetings, Anschutz
made an unprecedented move and decided to donate its drilling leases to the
National Trust for Historic Preservation.183 According to Lillian Sparks, a
legislative associate with the National Congress of American Indians, this
decision showed “the beginning of understanding and the kind of
cooperation that can take place between miners and some of our native
people.”184 Similarly, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton described the
decision as an example of “the successes we are achieving through the
process of consultation, cooperation and communication.”185
The Anschultz decision may not reflect the typical result of
consultations between tribes and permit holders, but it does show both the
power that consultations can have and the increased willingness on the part
of the BLM to encourage these types of negotiations. Although some critics
saw the granting of the permit as an indication of a concerning change in
administrative policy toward sacred sites,186 on closer examination, the
BLM’s decision actually reflected a continuation of the increased
awareness and concern for Indian sacred sites that had begun under the
Clinton Administration.187
180. Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, Weatherman Draw Oil and Gas
Exploration 1 (Dec. 20, 2001), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/mt/2002/ib/02mtb029_at17.wpd.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. April Reese, Company Drops Plans To Drill in Montana Valley Held Sacred by Tribes,
LAND LETTER, May 2, 2002, at http://www.eenews.net/subscriber/search/swishe-search.cgi
(providing a search form to archived materials).
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Geoffrey Mohan, Mogul Keeps Tribal Site Sacred; Anschutz’s Company Rules Out
Drilling for Oil in a Montana Canyon Graced with Ancient Indian Art, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2002, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. E.g., Kraker, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the permit was granted “12 days after
[George W. Bush] took office”).
187. In fact, the Clinton Administration conducted the environmental assessment upon which
the permit was granted. See Press Release, supra note 180, at 2.
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A similar example of the BLM’s continued willingness to consider
Indian concerns in its land management decisions can be seen in the BLM’s
decision to deny the Dacotah Cement Land Exchange Proposal. Dacotah
first approached the BLM with a land exchange proposal in 1997, at which
time it was told that such an exchange was possible but that there might be
cultural concerns.188 A cultural inventory subsequently identified numerous
sites of potential cultural significance to tribes in the region. In spite of
these findings, in September 2001, Dacotah indicated that it still wished to
proceed with the land exchange. Given the potential impact on Indian
sacred sites, however, the BLM refused. In fact, the BLM stated that “if the
extent of cultural resources had been known earlier, BLM would probably
not have entertained this exchange.”189
The BLM’s decision to refuse the exchange was based on a concern for
the preservation of Indian sacred sites. The BLM held repeated meetings
with affected tribes to discuss the potential impact of the exchange. These
meetings enabled the tribes to voice their opposition to the exchange and
explain the religious and cultural significance of the lands.190 As a result,
the BLM refused the proposal, even when facing pressure from the
Governor of South Dakota to approve the land exchange.191
Although the above examples are instances in which agencies have
continued to protect sacred sites despite a change in administration, there
are exceptions. In situations in which a previous administration has
significantly pushed the outer limits of agency accommodation, an
incoming administration may consider scaling back some of the most
unprecedented decisions, and there have been instances of this trend under
the Bush Administration. An obvious example is the Glamis Gold decision.
In January 2001, after a six-year permit process, the BLM made an
unprecedented choice:192 Outgoing Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
188. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC), the successor to the South Dakota state-owned
Dacotah Cement, offered to exchange its 3000-acre Hoffman Ranch to BLM for 2320 acres of
public lands with minerals and an additional 3620 acres of federal mineral estate on other GCCowned land. The exchange would have provided GCC with an estimated 200-year limestone
supply. Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, Dacotah Cement Land Exchange Proposal 1
(Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/mt/2002/ib/02mtb061_at8.wpd.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See Christine Knight, Comment, A Regulatory Minefield: Can the Department of
Interior Say “No” to a Hardrock Mine?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 621 (2002). According to
Knight:
[T]he Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) . . . explicitly
granted the Department of the Interior the organic authority to manage the federal
public lands, including those containing mining claims located under the Hardrock Act.
While noting that the rights conveyed by the Hardrock Act remained otherwise intact,
FLPMA imposed the following mandate upon the Secretary of the Interior: “In
managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands” . . . .
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denied Glamis a mining permit because of concerns over potential “cultural
impacts.”193 This was the first time a mining permit had ever been denied
for such reasons.194 Ten months later, Secretary Norton rescinded Babbitt’s
denial and allowed the permitting process to begin all over again.195
Norton’s decision was based on the Department of the Interior’s
determination that regulations requiring the consideration of “cultural
impacts” were inconsistent with the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA) of 1976, which gives the BLM the authority to regulate
public lands,196 and such regulations were thus an insufficient basis upon
which to deny a mine permit.197 These events concerning the Glamis mine
permit demonstrate the reversals that may occur when a subsequent
administration believes an earlier administration has gone too far.
In the Glamis case, it is highly likely that the change in administration
did influence the Department of the Interior’s decision to reconsider
Glamis’s permit request. However, Glamis was a unique case. It was an
example of an agency bending over backwards to accommodate Indian
interests. Secretary Babbitt’s decision to deny the mining permit was both
controversial and unprecedented. Not only was the mine denied in the final
days of the Clinton Administration, but it was also the first time a mining
permit had ever been denied based on the interpretation that the
“‘unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands’”198 provision of FLPMA
applied to the “‘cultural . . . resource values of the public lands.’”199 This
interpretation was quite controversial because “for over one hundred years,
the right to mine on public land had been unquestioned.”200
Therefore, although the change to a more conservative administration is
likely to reverse some of the most radical instances of agency
accommodation, as in Glamis, most instances of agency accommodation do
not fall into this category. If an agency decides to accommodate Indian
sacred sites under one administration, it appears more likely than not that

Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2000) (emphasis added)). In 2001, the BLM enacted revised
mining regulations that imposed even more stringent standards by granting the Department of the
Interior the right to deny a mining permit where “substantial, irreparable harm to significant
scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands” would result, and could
not be “effectively mitigated.” 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2001), quoted in Knight, supra, at 622-23.
It was under this provision that the BLM denied the Glamis mine permit.
193. Kraker, supra note 12, at 14.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785.
197. See Tom Kenworthy, New Mining Rules Reverse Provisions, USA TODAY, Oct. 26,
2001, at 8A; see also Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, BLM To Retain Key Hardrock
Mining Rule Provision (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.nv.blm.gov/News.Releases/Press_Releases/
fy2002/PR0204.htm.
198. Knight, supra note 192, at 621 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)).
199. Id. at 622-23 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2001)).
200. Id. at 623.
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this accommodation will continue through subsequent administrations as
well. As critics rightly point out, agency decisions are easier to reverse than
court decisions or legislation, but as discussed in the next Part, this
flexibility makes agency protection preferable to First Amendment
protection or a comprehensive sacred sites statute.
III. THE BENEFITS OF AGENCY ACCOMMODATION
VERSUS BROADER FORMS OF PROTECTION
A. The Unique Protection Afforded by Agencies
Although critics are right when they argue that a Supreme Court
decision or a comprehensive sacred sites statute would offer broader
protection for sacred sites, they are wrong when they argue that such an
approach would be preferable. As demonstrated above, the broad judicial
and legislative methods of protection advocated by most sacred sites
supporters are not the only ways to protect these sites. Tribes prefer such
methods because they are more likely to provide sweeping protection for all
sacred sites in all circumstances. Judicial and legislative methods of
protection would necessarily have to be extremely broad because the courts
and Congress are both ill-equipped to make potentially thousands of
detailed, individualized determinations as to whether and how a particular
site should be protected. This means that such protections would be grossly
overinclusive if made by the courts or Congress, preventing the use of lands
that the majority of society would want to be developed. In contrast, such
overinclusiveness is not a problem for agencies, which can adopt quite
specific protection plans. Furthermore, site-specific protection by agencies,
although narrower, is likely to satisfy more people than the type of broad
protection that would result from a Supreme Court opinion or congressional
statute.
Because agencies are already managing many of these sites, giving
agencies the power to make the rules that they will be enforcing increases
the likelihood that these rules will be a better fit with the agency, the
monument, and all those using the land than would rules resulting from
court opinions or broad legislative provisions. In Bear Lodge, the Park
Service spent years developing a management plan that took all competing
concerns into consideration and attempted to create a solution acceptable to
all interested parties. The result was extremely site-specific—much of it
concerned climbing and the specific effects of climbing on Devils Tower—
and would not have been appropriate for most or even many other sacred
sites. If individual agencies make the rules that they are going to have to
enforce, these rules will fit better with the protected area, and the land
agencies will be better equipped to enforce them.
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Another example of how agency-devised regulations are more easily
tailored to specific sites than those promulgated by the courts or Congress
can be seen in the management plan governing Rainbow Bridge National
Monument. At Rainbow Bridge, park rangers enforce the voluntary ban on
walking under the monument by informing visitors of the sacredness of the
site and explaining why they might not want to walk under it.201 Such a
regulation tries to accommodate all users of the site, even though it might
not be what either group would have chosen on its own. However, this is
the type of regulation that could only be devised by an agency intimately
familiar with the site it is regulating.
Leaving decisionmaking in the hands of the agencies administering the
sites also creates fairer, more balanced decisions. Agencies are likely to be
more familiar with the land dispute than either the courts or Congress, and
they will consequently have a better sense of the possible compromises that
can be reached. For instance, the agency decision regarding Zuni Salt Lake
shows how agencies can create an acceptable compromise even when the
solution they propose is different from the ones initially requested by the
parties. The Zuni Salt Lake and the area around it are sacred to the Zuni and
other Pueblo tribes.202 In May 2002, the Department of the Interior gave the
Salt River Project permission to begin work on a mine in the area that
would have required 4000 acre-feet of water per year from local aquifers in
order to work.203 The Zuni feared this pumping would drain their lake and
wanted it stopped. Sensitive to the concerns of both groups, the Department
came up with a compromise that allowed the construction of the mine to
proceed, but also protected the lake. The Department imposed a number of
restrictions on the mining project, including an absolute prohibition on any
pumping from the Dakota Aquifer, the aquifer most vital to the lake’s
survival.204 The plan also required the “Salt River Project to consult with
Indian tribes to develop cultural awareness programs for mine employees
and contractors.”205 This compromise is the type of solution that could only
be devised by an agency; it will allow the mine to be built, bringing
hundreds of jobs to the area, but it will not destroy the Zuni Salt Lake.206
Agency accommodation also creates an alternative to the traditional
liability and property rules that courts usually choose between when making
land-use determinations. In many of these sacred sites cases, neither a
property nor a liability rule would create an acceptable solution to the
201. Bonham, supra note 8, at 190.
202. See Winona Laduke, The Salt Woman and the Coal Mine, SIERRA, Nov./Dec. 2002,
at 44, 46.
203. Kraker, supra note 12, at 13.
204. Id.
205. Leslie Linthicum, Zunis Seek Help in Mine Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 17, 2002,
at B3.
206. Id.
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problem. For example, in the Zuni Salt Lake case, if the Zuni had been
given a property rule they would have simply prohibited the construction of
the mine, regardless of the most efficient outcome: Unlike most property
use situations, religious sites are less susceptible to bargaining, even if a
compromise would benefit both parties. A liability rule requiring the Salt
River Project to compensate the tribe for the destruction of the site would
be similarly undesirable, given the difficulty of placing monetary value on a
sacred site. If the construction of the mine destroyed the Zuni Salt Lake, no
amount of money could adequately compensate the Zuni Pueblo for their
loss. Accordingly, agency accommodation, which is able to take religious
value into account in a way that a strict property- or liability-rule regime
cannot, seems ideally suited for these types of land disputes. Agency
decisions can create the most efficient outcomes because, in considering the
desires of each side, agencies are more likely to leave both parties to the
dispute better off than if one side had the unilateral ability to determine the
future of sacred site land. Although tribes like the Zuni might find agency
accommodation less desirable than protection that would give them
complete control over their sacred sites, agency protection, which can
accommodate competing interests while still protecting sacred sites, is
preferable from the perspective of society as a whole.
Furthermore, the benefit of leaving land-use determinations in agency
hands is especially high because sacred sites regulation is rarely a zero-sum
game. Again, as the Zuni Salt Lake example demonstrates, lands can often
be used in a variety of different ways without foreclosing all other uses.
Furthermore, even in instances of irreconcilable incompatibility, such as the
flooding that destroyed the Cherokee burial sites in the Tennessee Valley,207
it still may be best to leave such decisions in the hands of individual
agencies, so that these types of decisions can be made on a case-by-case
basis and not as the result of sweeping rules that leave no room for
compromise even when compromise is an option.
B. Protection Against Agency Abuse
The concerns with agency protection are not unfounded. While
agencies have the ability to provide real protection for Indian sacred sites,
their only legal obligation is to consult with affected tribes. Observers
understandably worry that tribes are overly dependent on agency “good
will” for the protection of their sacred sites.208 However, the choice to leave

207. See supra text accompanying note 23.
208. Robert S. Michaelsen, Is the Miner’s Canary Silent? Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Denial of American Indian Free Exercise of Religion Claims, 6 J.L. & RELIGION 97, 105
(1988) (arguing that “Indian religious practitioners . . . . are left with no other avenues of recourse
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these decisions in agency hands is not one based on blind faith. If agencies
accept their responsibility to protect Indian sacred sites, then their
protection is preferable for the reasons discussed above. Furthermore, if
agencies fail to adequately protect these sites, Indian sacred sites will not
necessarily go without protection: Tribes have other forms of recourse and
are not solely dependent on agency goodwill.
In particular, every year for the past two decades Congress has
protected at least one individual sacred site.209 For instance, Congress
designated El Malpais in New Mexico a national monument in 1987.210
This area, created by ancient lava flows, has been considered sacred by the
Acoma, Hopi, and Zuni tribes for more than 10,000 years.211 Similarly, in
1993 Congress passed an Act recognizing the Hawaiian island of
Kaho’olawe, which is sacred to Native Hawaiians, as a national cultural
treasure, permanently stopped its use as a military training facility, and then
returned the island to the state of Hawaii.212 In 2000, Congress passed the
Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, authorizing the purchase of five parcels
of land as a reservation for the Timbisha Shoshone tribe, and an additional
two parcels that were part of the tribes’ ancestral homeland and that have
historical, cultural, and spiritual significance for the tribe.213 These
individual protection statutes are similar to agency protection in that the
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis and extend specific
protection to individual sites, but also serve as a safety valve for those
instances in which agency protections alone may fail. Through its readiness
to enact such statutes, Congress has demonstrated that it is willing to
protect individual sacred sites. Therefore, if an agency were to deny
protection to an Indian sacred site, a tribe would still have the option of
seeking congressional protection.
CONCLUSION
The courts and Congress have left sacred sites protection in the hands
of land management agencies, and although many feared this decision
would be disastrous, land agencies have actually embraced their role and
sought to accommodate Indian religions and protect their sacred sites.

than the good will of governmental administrative agencies”); Lee, supra note 7, at 287
(describing how the protections of the AIRFA are dependant on agency “good will”).
209. Indians Urge Cohesive Policy on Sacred Lands, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 14, 2002, at F4.
210. Act of Dec. 31, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539.
211. Joseph Maes, The Lava Tubes of El Malpais, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 16, 2003,
at C1.
212. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, §§ 10,00110,004, 107 Stat. 1418, 1480-84 (1993).
213. Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat. 1875 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa
note (2000)).
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Furthermore, agency accommodation is actually better for society as a
whole than the broader judicial and legislative protections typically
advocated by sacred sites supporters. Agency accommodation avoids the
disadvantages of broad categorical protection while still serving as a strong
method for preserving sacred sites. Although land agencies have had the
role of sacred sites protectors thrust upon them, they seem to have turned
out to be ideally suited for the job.

